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The objective of this paper is to investigate the trade potential of the fifteen old EU 
countries with the ten new members having joined on May 1st, 2004. Our focus lies not 
so much on the integration process already having taken place, but on the importance of 
institutional factors for trade. To this aim we estimate a standard gravity model applying 
both cross-section as well as static and dynamic panel data techniques. We conclude 
that there is further potential for trade resulting not from the formal accession to the EU, 
but rather from the successive alignment of the new members´ institutional framework 
to EU standards. 
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** Corresponding Author. 1 Introduction
The Eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) by ten new mem-
bers on May 1st, 2004 constitutes an outstanding event in European history.
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania together with Malta and Cyprus1 joined the EU bringing along
more than 75 million new European citizens. The enlargement will aﬀect
many of the old and new members’ economic aﬀairs. Here, we put emphasis
on the foreign trade relations between the 15 old EU countries (EU-15) and
the ten new members. Has the formal act of accession created an additional
trade potential between them?
A priori an answer is not so easy to give. Many authors estimated big poten-
tials in the trade volume between the EU and the Central and East European
countries after the fall of the Iron Curtain, e.g. Winters and Wang (1994),
Baldwin (1994). However, the Europe Agreements concluded between the
EU and the accession countries in the 1990s lead to a continuous reduction
of barriers to trade and to an integration process culminating in the AC-10
entering the European Single Market simultaneously with EU membership.
Consequently, recent studies conclude that the trade potential might already
be exploited, Breuss and Egger (1999) and Piazolo (2001). Yet there remain
informal barriers to trade, resulting from still existing diﬀerent institutional
settings in the old and the new EU members.2 Entering the EU especially
means adopting the Acquis Communautaire, hereby reducing any informal
barriers to trade by slowly changing the institutional framework.
The scope of our work is to investigate if the adjustment of the AC-10s’
institutional setting to that of the EU-15 might give rise to a further po-
tential in foreign trade between the old and the new member countries. To
this end we follow the methodology of the seminal studies undertaken in the
early nineties and resort to the gravity model. Using recent data, we ﬁrst
analyze if there still exists further trade potential when taking into account
only the commonly used explanatory variables GDP, population, distance
as a proxy for transportation costs, and trade bloc dummies. Here, we ex-
pect no more trade expansion resulting solely from the AC-10s’ accession to
the EU, apart from the generally strong connection between GDP and trade
volume. Further potential is rather assumed to result from the adjustment
of the AC-10s’ institutional environment to that of the EU-15. The diﬀer-
ences can be quantiﬁed by institutional variables indicating the degree of
economic freedom in each country. The variables are part of the Index of
1Hereafter labeled as AC-10.
2Of course they also exist between the single countries of the EU-15, but the diﬀerences
between them are smaller as compared with the new member states.
2Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation. They comprise,
among other factors, government intervention, restrictions on foreign busi-
ness, and the embodiment of property rights. Under the assumption that the
institutional environment of the AC-10 converges towards the EU standard
further trade expansion can be estimated. Since it is to be expected that the
institutional variables did not abruptly change with the accession on May 1st,
2004 the such calculated trade potential can be exploited only in the medium
to long run. In all our regressions we not only resort to the commonly used
cross-sectional method, but also apply the more sophisticated static and dy-
namic panel estimation techniques in order to incorporate changes over time.
The paper is structured as followed. In section 2, we give a short overview
of the link between institutions and trade. Section 3 discusses the gravity
model and its empirical applications. In section 4, the data and estimation
techniques are presented. The results of our calculations for the EU-15s’ ex-
port and import potential are reported in sections 5 and 6, respectively. We
conclude with a discussion of our ﬁndings.
2 Institutions and Trade
In recent years the link between institutions and trade has become more
prominent in the economic literature, acknowledging that there are more bar-
riers to trade than tariﬀs, quotas and distance. Anderson and Marcouiller
(2002) point out hidden transaction costs as a source of insecurity in in-
ternational exchange. They are often related to incomplete or asymmetric
information. The importance of information costs that are caused by phys-
ical (and cultural) distances is emphasized by Rauch (2001). North (1990)
argues that people build institutions in order to reduce imperfect insight and
incomplete information. Much research has also been carried out on the im-
pact of institutions on transactions costs and their relation to growth and
development.3 Poor governance is maintained to entail negative external-
ities for private transactions, thus raising transaction costs and ultimately
causing negative eﬀects on growth and development. These arguments can
well be applied to international trade, see e.g. Wei (2000). International
transactions involve at least two governance systems. That is why the ef-
fectiveness of domestic institutions in securing and enforcing property rights
in the exchange of goods is an important determinant of trade costs. More-
over, formal rules and regulations inﬂuence informal norms of behaviour and
inter-personal trust, which aﬀect the conventions of doing business. These,
in turn, may also show in risk perceptions and preferences in international
3See e.g. Hall and Jones (1999), Olson (1996) or Knack and Keefer (1997).
3trade.
Compared to the empirical literature on institutions and growth (see e.g.
Frankel and Romer (1999)), the impact of institutions on international trade
has been subject of very few empirical studies. Three papers consider em-
pirically the inﬂuence of institutions on trade in a gravity model context.
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) estimate how insecurity as a hidden tax
on trade reduces bilateral trade. They conclude that inadequate institutions
constrain trade as much as tariﬀs do. In the line of Anderson and Macrouiller,
de Groot, Linder, Rietveld, and Subramnian (2004) employ a cross-section
gravity model. They ﬁnd that a similar institutional framework of two coun-
tries promotes their bilateral trade. Finally, Babetskaia-Koukhartchouk and
Maurel (2004) analyze the eﬀect of joining international institutions such as
the WTO and the EU on trade. They estimate the potential for an increase
in trade ﬂows based on panel estimations in the case of Russia´s accession
to the WTO.
3 The Gravity Model
In the last decades, the gravity model, based on Isaac Newton’s law of grav-
itation, has become a popular instrument in empirical international trade
analysis. Tinbergen (1962), P¨ oyh¨ onen (1963), and Linnemann (1966) were
the ﬁrst to explain the size of bilateral trade ﬂows with gravity-type models.
In its basic form, the gravity model states that foreign trade between two
countries is a positive function of their incomes, which can be taken as a proxy
for the respective supply and demand conditions, and a negative function of
the distance between countries (as a proxy for transportation costs). Trade
between exporting country i and importing country j (Xij) is the higher the
greater the countries’ economic strength, generally measured by their GDP
(Yi,j) or GDP per capita, and the smaller the geographic distance (Dij) be-
tween them. Transformed into its logarithmic form, this relationship can be
expressed as followed:
Xij = β0 + β1 ln(Yi) + β2 ln(Yj) + β3 ln(Dij) + uij (1)
In equation (1), the coeﬃcients are expected to show a positive sign, whereas
β3 should feature a negative sign. Equation (1) represents the basic gravity
model. It can be extended by several other variables and dummies indicating
for example the membership in regional trade blocs or other trade-stimulating
or trade-hampering factors. The gravity model has provided very robust re-
sults in its empirical application. However, the theoretical foundations were
initially very poor. This has changed over the last decades. Anderson (1979),
4Bergstrand (1985), Bergstrand (1989), Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (2001),
or Evenett and Keller (2002) were able to reconcile the gravity model with
several trade theories.
The gravity model has increasingly been used to analyze the trade potential
between two countries or regions. This line of research has become promi-
nent in the early nineties in dealing with the integration of the former CMEA
countries into the international division of labor. Empirical studies with em-
phasis on trade between the EU and the Central and East European countries
include Hamilton and Winters (1992), Winters and Wang (1994), Baldwin
(1994), and Christin (1996). In general, the authors assume that foreign
trade between the East and West European countries will in the medium
term reach the trade intensity existing between countries already well inte-
grated in the world trade system. Under the assumption that trade between
these countries follows a ”normal”, i.e. non-distorted, pattern, a gravity
model is then used to estimate this trade pattern. By simply inserting data
on the East European countries into the gravity equation with the coeﬃcients
resulting from the estimation of the ”normal” trade pattern, potential trade
ﬂows can be calculated. If potential trade exceeds actual trade, then there
is further scope for expansion.
Our study extends this line of research on the trade potential started in the
early nineties with the focus on foreign trade between the EU-15 and the
AC-10. We estimate the potential for the EU-15s’ exports to as well as their
imports from the AC-10 with the commonly used variables GDP and distance
and furthermore put emphasis on the importance of institutional aspects in
promoting international trade.
4 Data and Estimation Methods
Our sample consists of 25 OECD countries plus the AC-10.4 We use yearly
data from 1995 to 2003 for the estimation of exports and imports. Since
especially at the beginning of the 1990s the trade pattern of the Central
and East European countries underwent dramatic changes due to the eco-
nomic breakdown after the fall of the Iron Curtain, we don’t consider the
years before 1995. Foreign trade data was obtained from the IMF’s World
4The considered countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Canada,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovac Republic, Slovenia, South
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USA. Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as one
country.
5Trade Statistics.5 Constant GDP (in 1995 US dollars), GDP per capita, and
population data were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. For the calculation of the distance between the countries we re-
ferred to the distance in km between their capitals.6
For capturing the changes in the AC-10s´ institutional environment we resort
to the Index of Economic Freedom, published yearly by the Heritage Foun-
dation7 and the Wall Street Journal. It oﬀers an examination of the factors
that contribute most directly to economic freedom and prosperity (see Table
1).
Table 1: Institutional Factors
Factors of Economic freedom Explanations
Trade Policy Tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers
Fiscal Burden of Government Tax rates, government expenditure
Government Intervention in the Econ-
omy
Government consumption and produc-
tion
Monetary Policy Inﬂation Rate
Capital Flows and Foreign Investment Restrictions on foreign investment
Banking and Finance Restrictions on credit and ﬁnance
Wages and Prices Regulations of wage and price setting
mechanisms
Property Rights Legal environment concerning private
property
Regulation Hindrances in opening and operating a
business
Informal Market Level of corruption and size of the in-
formal market
Economic freedom is deﬁned as ”the absence of government coercion or con-
straint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services
beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty it-
self” 8. The index summarizes ten diﬀerent factors of economic freedom,
which can take on values between 1 (lowest level of state intervention, i.e.
highest level of freedom) and 5 (highest level of state intervention, i.e. low-
est level of freedom). In analogy to Babetskaia-Koukhartchouk and Maurel
(2004) we use the index to analyze the link between economic freedom and
5It is common knowledge that trade is not a nominal but a real phenomenon. Unfor-
tunately there are no foreign trade price indices for our sample countries available so that




6trade in the framework of our gravity model.
The question of the proper speciﬁcation of the gravity model has been in-
creasingly discussed in the literature. While many studies were carried out
with cross-sectional estimation methods, M´ aty´ as (1997), Breuss and Egger
(1999) or Egger and Pfaﬀenmayr (2003) pointed out that the panel approach
is a more appropriate procedure. In order to compare our results to the ones
of the earlier studies, we run our regressions ﬁrst with cross-sectional data.
We use the latest available data and average it over the years 2001 to 2003
in order to minimize exchange rate ﬂuctuations, outliers and changes in the
relative prices. In a second step, we take into account the information con-
tained in time and undertake panel regressions over the period 1995 to 2003.
Our exact speciﬁcation of the gravity model is similar to that of Rose (2004)
and given by
ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1 ln(GDPit) + β2 ln(GDPjt) + β3 ln(GDPpcit) (2)
+β4 ln(GDPpcjt) + β5 ln(Distij) + β6EUij + β7NAFTAij










β32+kY EARk + ci + ijt
where i and j denote trading partners, t denotes time, and the variables are
deﬁned as:
• Xijt denotes the exports and imports respectively between countries i
and j at time t,
• GDP is real GDP in 1995 US dollars,
• GDPpc is GDP per capita in 1995 US dollars,
• Dist is the distance between i and j in km,
• EU is a binary variable, which is unity if both trading partners are
members of the EU,
• NAFTA is a binary variable, which is unity if i and j are members of
the NAFTA,
• CEEC is a binary variable, which is unity if both trading partners
belong to the AC-10,
7• Lang is a binary variable, which is unity if both trading partners share
the same oﬃcial language,
• Border is a binary variable, which is unity if both trading partners
share a common border,
• INST comprises the institutional variables,
• Y EAR represents time dummies for the year 1996-2003, capturing un-
observed time eﬀects.
• ci country-speciﬁc eﬀect.
• ijt represents the omitted other inﬂuences on bilateral trade.
All standard variables except the distance variable should feature a positive
sign. Postulating that more economic freedom promotes foreign trade we
expect the institutional variables to have a negative sign, since 1 represents
the highest and 5 the lowest degree of freedom.
We start by employing a simple random and ﬁxed eﬀects estimation to control
for country-speciﬁc eﬀects. Here, we have to account for dynamic misspeciﬁ-
cation and heteroskedasticity of the error term. To this end we additionally
work with autocorrelated panel techniques for ﬁrst-order serial correlation
as well as for panel-speciﬁc correlation and heteroscedasticity following Prais
and Winston (1954). For the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we assume that the error
term is ijt = ρijt−1 + uit and uit is iid.
Furthermore, we take into account a possible endogeneity bias, as increases
in trade can be associated with improvements in institutional quality, i.e. all
institutional variables are possibly correlated with the residuals and omitted
ﬁxed eﬀects. We solve this by employing both an IV regression and a proce-
dure proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). This procedure instruments
the endogenous variable and exploits the cross-section and dynamic dimen-
sions of the panel data set using ﬁxed-eﬀect estimates. The determination
which variables are exogenous (and thus can be used as an instrument) is
not an easy task. Additionally to the institutional variables we could fur-
ther assume the GDP and GDP per capita variables to be endogenous, as
these variable can be determined by trade ﬂows, see e.g. Frankel and Romer
(1999). We assume that GDP and GDP per capita is exogenous. Besides the
institutional variables, we set the EU and the NAFTA dummy as endogenous
since the single countries can determine freely to join these trade blocs.9
9The CEEC dummy cannot be considered as endogenous because it is a geographical
description which does not change over time.
8In addition to the static analysis of our data, we estimate the eﬀects of insti-
tutions on trade growth with a dynamic panel data model in order to account
for the inﬂuences of the explanatory variables over time. A simple dynamic
panel model is given by
ln(Xijt) = β0(ln(Xijt−1)) + βi(Yijt) + ci + ijt, (3)
where Yijt includes the explanatory variables from (2). Arellano and Bond
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1995) have shown
that this model can be consistently and eﬃciently estimated by using ﬁrst
diﬀerences and a system GMM estimation approach. Rewriting (3) we get:
ln(Xijt)−ln(Xijt−1) = β0(ln(Xijt−1)−ln(Xijt−2))+βi(Yijt−Yijt−1)+ijt−ijt−1.
(4)
The Arellano-Bond estimator requires for its consistency a lack of second
order correlation and a valid Sargan test. It uses the lagged diﬀerences as
instruments, whereas the Blundell-Bond estimator utilizes the lagged levels
and lagged diﬀerences of the explanatory variables, hereby allowing to use an
additional observation in time compared to the Arellano-Bond. Therefore,
the Blundell-Bond method is more eﬃcient than the latter one.
5 Export Potentials - Results
Before we estimate the inﬂuence of the AC-10s’ changing institutional set-
ting on the trade volume, we want to ascertain that further potential neither
arises from the ten countries’ accession to the EU nor from other trade-
fostering factors as depicted in equation (2). Table 3 employs the estimation
results for the classical gravity model without institutional variables for the
25 OECD countries whose trade relations are assumed to follow the ”nor-
mal” trade pattern. We ﬁrst estimated a cross-section model (column 2).
The GDPs of the exporting and importing country as well as the distance
between them are highly relevant in explaining the bilateral trade volume.
It is interesting to note that based on this estimation membership in the EU
as well as a common border have no inﬂuence on trade. Calculations of the
actual and predicted trade ﬂows between the EU-15 and the AC-10 show,
as expected, that there is no further trade potential.10 Thus, the EU-15 and
the AC-10 have basically exploited the high trade potentials expected by the
earlier studies. Estimations of cross sections for every year from 1995 to 2003
10The calculations can be obtained from the authors upon request.
9encourages the ﬁnding that the formal accession has not generated further
potential in trade, since the EU dummy from these cross-section estimations
is insigniﬁcant for each time period after 1997.
Column 3 in Table 3 exhibits the results for the pooled OLS estimation, as-
suming that no variable is endogenous in the sense as given in Wooldridge
(2002). Here, the same variables are signiﬁcant as in the simple cross-section
estimation. As it is implausible that there are unobserved individual eﬀects
and to explicitly take into account time eﬀects we further estimate a random
(RE) and a ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) model. The results are depicted in columns
4 and 5, respectively. Since the Hausman test indicates that there is a sys-
tematic diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients between these two estimation methods
the FE model should be employed. This is conﬁrmed by the fact that GDP
per capita of the exporting country is signiﬁcant only in the FE estimation,
whereas in the RE estimation it is not. Column 6 show the estimation re-
sults corrected for heteroskedasticity and a possible AR(1) process in the
residuals. The coeﬃcients exhibit similar magnitudes. The dynamic panel
estimation methods proved not to be consistent. Although that there is a
lack of second order autocorrelation both the Sargan as well as the Hansen
test point out, that the instruments11 are correlated with the errors terms.
Summing up the results for the estimation of the gravity equation without
institutional variables, all the employed estimation methods show that there
remains no further potential for the EU-15s’ exports to the AC-10.
Table 4 presents the results of the same estimation methods as used above ex-
tended by an IV regression and the Hauman-Taylor procedure including the
institutional variables both for the exporting and importing country, respec-
tively. The coeﬃcients feature similar values and signiﬁcance characteristics
as in Table 3. We left out the RE coeﬃcients as the the Hausman test points
out to the FE model. In the IV case it chooses the RE model. Again the
dynamic models fail, as the instruments are correlated with the error term
and can therefore not be used for potential calculations. The majority of
the institutional coeﬃcients show the expected negative signs. In some cases
the coeﬃcients are positive, e.g. of Capital Flows and Foreign Investment
(FE, HT), Property Rights (FE, HT, and RE IV) and Regulation (FE). In
this case liberalization measures in these policy areas would lead to a slight
decrease in exports. The coeﬃcients of Trade Policy are insigniﬁcant, except
for the RE IV case, both for the exporting as well as the importing country.
This results gives assurance that the trade pattern of the selected sample of
countries is indeed not distorted by tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers.
11The lagged diﬀerences in the Arellano-Bond case and lagged diﬀerences and lagged
levels in the Blundell-Bond case.
10For the calculation of the EU-15s’ export potential to the AC-10 we use only
the variables which are at least signiﬁcant at the 10% level for both for coun-
try i and j. In the case of both the ﬁxed-eﬀects as well as the Hausman-Taylor
estimation these are
• Fiscal Burden of Government,
• Monetary Policy,
• Wages and Prices,
• Property Rights,
• Regulation.
The calculation of the trade potential is based on the assumption that the
accession countries’ institutional variables will reach the level of the corre-
sponding trading partners in the EU-15. The algebraic calculation is straight-
forward
∆lnXij = exp[ˆ αi(INSTi − INSTj) + ˆ αj(INSTi − INSTj)] − 1, (5)
where ˆ αi,j represents the coeﬃcient of the respective institutional variable
and INSTi,j stands for its value.
Table 2: Export potential for Germany
Fiscal Monetary WP PR Regulation sum
CYP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CZR 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
EST 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
HUN 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.29
LAT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LIT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MAL 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.10
POL 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.29
SLR 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.29
SLV 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19
We choose Germany as an example and demonstrate the resulting export
potential with each of the AC-10 in Table 2. If a factor of economic free-
dom for an accession country exhibits a lower value than for Germany we set
the export potential to zero, because we assume that the accession country
11will not experience a worsening of its institutional environment after the en-
largement.12 This is completely the case for Fiscal Burden of Government,
Property Rights, and Regulation. In these areas, all of the AC-10 have already
achieved a higher degree of economic freedom than Germany. The chance
for an additional increase in exports mainly results from a liberalization of
the monetary policy in six out of the ten new members. The second chance
lies in a further deregulation of wage and price setting mechanisms in Hun-
gary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia. Summing up over all relevant institutional
variables (last column), Germany could achieve the highest export growth
towards Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. According to our FE estimation, it
would result in an additional plus of 29%.
Likewise, Table 5 reports all export potentials the old EU members could
realize with each of the AC-10. We report the calculations for all of the four
relevant estimation techniques depicted in Table 4. Again, a value of zero
indicates that the accession country possesses a better institutional environ-
ment than its trading partner. This is especially the case for the three Baltic
countries, regardless of the estimation technique. Among the EU-15, Den-
mark could gain most from the alignment of the AC-10’s institutional setting
to its own. The last row depicts the export potential the old EU members
would achieve if the AC-10 brought their respective institutional environment
into line with the average institutional setting over all the EU-15. According
to our ﬁxed- eﬀects estimation, the least export potential can be gained with
Latvia and Lithuania; it would only amount to a further growth of 4%. On
the other side, the EU-15 could credit itself with an additional export plus of
29% respectively if Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia adopted the same degree
of economic freedom.
There exist quite large diﬀerences in the magnitude of the export potentials
when considering the four diﬀerent estimates. In the case of the latter four
countries, the range for an additional export growth goes from 24% to up to
76%. This is partly due to the varying number as well as the signiﬁcance of
the institutional variables in each estimation. The FGLS results oﬀer only
three signiﬁcant variables, out of which two are not signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed-
eﬀects and the Hausman-Taylor procedure (Government Intervention in the
Economy and Capital Flows and Foreign Investment). Random-eﬀects with
instrumental variables yields four signiﬁcant variables. Here, Trade Policy is
highly signiﬁcant, which contradicts the fact that most of the tariﬀ and non-
tariﬀ barriers between the EU-15 and the AC-10 were continuously abolished
in the Nineties. Furthermore, the estimated coeﬃcient on Informal Market
for the exporting country shows a very high value. This is the main reason
12However, we cannot completely exclude such a deterioration.
12why the export potential calculated with RE IV so highly exceeds the poten-
tials calculated with the other three estimation methods, where overall the
results are quite close together.
Apart from the features of the respective estimation techniques, the results
on the export potential must also be interpreted carefully, because a new EU
member country cannot adopt all changes in its institutional environment
at the same time. Thus they have to be interpreted as ceteris paribus, i.e.
other changes in their economic environment are not considered here. In
spite of these limitations, we can conclude that there exists a substantial ex-
port potential for the old EU members due to future changes in the AC-10s’
institutional setting.
6 Import Potentials - Results
For the estimation of the EU-15s’ import potential from the AC-10, i.e. the
ten new members’ export potential to the old members, we proceed in the
same way as in the above section. The results for the import side (see Ta-
ble 6) are similar to the ones obtained from the export regression when not
taking into account the institutional variables (see Table 3). Again, when
deciding between the FE and RE model, the Hausman test points towards
the former. Arellano-Bond and Blundel-Bond proved again not to be appli-
cable for the same reasons as in the exports regressions.
Table 7 includes the institutional variables in the estimations. The same
interpretations as for the export side applies. A only diﬀerence is that the
Hausman test points out to the FE IV model in contrast to the RE IV model
for the export regressions.
As with the export potential, the coeﬃcients feature similar values and sig-
niﬁcance characteristics. For the calculation of the EU-15s’ import potential
we again use the institutional variables at least signiﬁcant at the 10% level.






The calculation follows equation (3). Table 8 reports the import potential
for each of the old EU members with the AC-10. Taking the average of the
13EU-15 and the FE results as a basis, imports from Malta could grow the
strongest, followed again by Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Slo-
vakia. These countries have the chance on their turn of further expanding
their exports to the EU-15. The least import potential for the old EU mem-
bers can be gained with Cyprus and Hungary.
As with the export potential, there exist quite large diﬀerences between the
four diﬀerent estimates. Import potentials are the smallest with GLS and
Hausman-Taylor, again partly based on the relatively small amount of signiﬁ-
cant institutional variables. As Table 10 shows, in the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation
it is only Capital Flows and Foreign Investment that contributes to an ad-
ditional growth of imports. In the ﬁxed-eﬀects results, on the contrary, the
ﬁve signiﬁcant institutional variables feature all much higher coeﬃcients in
absolute terms than the other three estimates. Again, this is especially the
case for Informal Market of the importing country. Since, according to the
Index of Economic Freedom, some of the mew EU members still have some
way to go in order to reach the average EU level, this is where the relatively
big import potential from some countries originates.
For the results on the import potential, the same caution must be used as
for the exports. On the whole, we can establish that the EU-15s’ potential
imports from the ten new member countries, i.e. the AC-10’s exports into
the old EU members, even exceeds the potential exports of the EU-15 into
the AC-10 because of an assimilation of their institutional standards.
7 Summary
The objective of our study was to ﬁnd out if the 15 old EU members could
expect an additional trade potential with the ten accession countries result-
ing from the alignment of their institutional environment to EU standards.
For the calculation of potential export and import ﬂows we resorted to the
well-known gravity model. A cross section estimation of the gravity model
with the most commonly used variables showed, as expected, no further po-
tential for trade expansion. We then extended our basic gravity model by
adding institutional variables indicating the degree of the respective coun-
tries´ economic freedom. They comprise the level of corruption, the size of
the informal market, and the legal environment concerning private property,
among other things. To explicitly take into account time eﬀects we addi-
tionally ran static and dynamic panel-based regressions. The dynamic panel
regressions proved not to be consistent. The results indicate both a remain-
ing potential for exports as well as for imports. Imports into the EU-15 will
be especially fostered by the ﬁght against corruption and the informal market
14in the new EU member countries.
We have to make two reservations on our ﬁndings. First, we don’t take into
account other factors spurring or hampering growth that could inﬂuence
the potential for trade. Particularly, it is well possible that the still higher
GDP growth in many of the AC-10 may also result in a higher trade poten-
tial. Second, although the AC-10 have to adopt the Acquis Communautaire
their institutional environment will not converge immediately towards the
EU level. The calculated trade potentials can only be gained in the medium
to long run.
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18Table 4: Estimation results with institutional variables - Exports
Static Estimators Dynamic Estimators
FE FGLS HT RE IV AB BB
Xijt−1 0.187∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗
GDPi 0.658∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
GDPj 1.504∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 1.235∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 2.482∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
GDPpci 0.693∗∗∗ -0.063 0.611∗∗∗ 0.004 0.777∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
GDPpcj 0.161 -0.017 0.243∗∗ 0.015 -0.053 0.009
Distij -1.122∗∗∗ -2.676∗∗∗ -1.135∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
EUij -0.056 -9.023 -0.127 -0.021∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
NAFTAij 1.258 135.510 1.196∗∗ -0.040 -0.407
CEECij 1.304∗∗∗ 1.209 1.414∗∗∗ 0.002 0.867∗∗∗
Langij 0.282∗∗∗ 1.847 0.0339∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ 0.125∗
Borderij 0.337∗∗∗ -8.527 0.160 0.006 -0.519∗∗∗
Tradei -0.014 0.018 -0.010 0.095∗∗∗ -0.017 0.028∗∗∗
Tradej 0.019 0.005 0.023 -0.101∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.027∗∗
Fiscali -0.052∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.053∗∗∗ -0.089 -0.040∗∗ -0.018∗
Fiscalj 0.047∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.068 0.067∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
Intervi -0.106∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.024∗ -0.16∗∗
Intervj -0.003 0.046∗∗ 0.001 -0.079 -0.003 0.004
Monetaryi -0.044∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.081∗∗∗
Monetaryj -0.042∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.009
Capitali 0.011 -0.045∗∗∗ 0.017 0.021 -0.020 -0.010
Capitalj 0.034∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗ -0.096∗∗ 0.058∗∗ -0.026
Bankingi 0.013 -0.040∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.048 0.012 -0.011
Bankingj -0.057∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.060∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ 0.013 0.010
WPi -0.031∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
WPj -0.061∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.057∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.044 0.030
PRi 0.103∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.038 0.020
PRj 0.070∗∗∗ -0.003 0.078∗∗∗ 0.005 0.043 -0.009
Regi 0.050∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.007
Regj 0.065∗∗∗ 0.032 0.067∗∗∗ -0.008 0.001 0.048∗∗∗
IMi -0.070 -0.332∗∗∗ -0.111 0.561∗ -0.132 -0.156
IMj -0.007 0.017 -0.011 -0.062∗ 0.021 0.035∗∗
Observations 10710 10710 10710 9520 8330 9520
R2 0.53 0.186
Hausman 0.000
2nd order AC 0.795 0.190
Sargan 0.026
Hansen 0.006
Notes: Regressand: log exports. Intercept and time dummies included but not reported.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. FE = Fixed eﬀects,
FGLS = Feasible GLS, HT = Hausman-Taylor, RE = Random Eﬀects IV, AB = Arellano
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21Table 7: Estimation results with institutional variables - Imports
Static Estimators Dynamic Estimators
FE FGLS HT FE IV AB BB
Xijt−1 0.215∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗
GDPi 1.644∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗ 1.639∗∗∗ 2.999∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
GDPj 0.731∗∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗ 1.212∗∗∗ 0.397 0.437∗ 0.222∗∗∗
GDPpci 0.711∗∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.184 -0.334 -0.004
GDPpcj 0.271∗∗ -0.007 0.352∗∗∗ -0.025 0.205 -0.010
Distij -1.048∗∗∗ -2.110∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
EUij -0.146∗∗ -8.281∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
NAFTAij 1.151∗∗∗ 16.350 -0.061∗ -0.042
CEECij 1.146∗∗∗ 0.269 0.008 1.020∗∗∗
Langij 0.261∗∗∗ 0.561 -0.052∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗
Borderij 0.277∗∗∗ -1.208 0.009 -0.542∗∗∗
Tradei -0.048∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.018∗
Tradej 0.058∗∗∗ 0.032 0.051∗∗ 0.075 0.038 0.018
Fiscali 0.009 0.019 0.015 -0.227∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
Fiscalj -0.007 0.014 -0.010 -0.113∗ -0.041∗ -0.022
Intervi -0.025∗∗∗ -0.027 -0.031∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.009
Intervj -0.026 0.000 0.011 0.222∗∗ -0.008 -0.006
Monetaryi 0.007 -0.015 -0.001 0.104∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.014
Monetaryj 0.054∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.002 -0.011
Capitali -0.060∗∗∗ -0.048∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.027 -0.020∗∗
Capitalj 0.037∗ -0.063∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
Bankingi -0.058∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.025 -0.003
Bankingj 0.013 -0.066∗∗ 0.011 0.070 0.024 -0.024∗∗∗
WPi -0.015 -0.050 -0.002 -0.020 -0.060∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
WPj -0.029 -0.089∗∗∗ -0.035 0.047 -0.039 -0.038∗∗
PRi 0.072∗∗∗ -0.002 0.062∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.016 0.060∗∗∗
PRj 0.089∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ -0.039 -0.065∗∗∗
Regi 0.026∗ -0.011 0.012 0.108∗∗∗ 0.011 0.009
Regj 0.121∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.022 0.053∗∗∗
IMi -0.281∗∗ 0.044 -0.181 -0.841∗∗ -0.089 0.089
IMj -0.057∗∗∗ -0.052∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.018
Observations 10710 10710 10710 9520 8330 9520
R2 0.54
Hausman 0.000 0.000
1st order AC 0.000 0.000
2nd order AC 0.495 0.695
Sargan 0.040
Hansen 0.000
Notes: Regressand: log imports. Intercept and time dummies included but not re-
ported. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. FE = Fixed
eﬀects, FGLS = Feasible GLS, HT = Hausman-Taylor, RE = Random Eﬀects IV, AB =
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